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n a 2004 interview with the late Everett 
Rogers, author of the book Diffusion of 
Innovation, Rogers lamented that in 1963, he and 
other members of a prominent research group 
expected to solve the remaining international 
development problems and end poverty within 
ten to fifteen years. (Rogers, 2004) Now, forty-
five years hence, it is time for a “reality check.” 
While it is refreshing to be reminded of a time 
when it was acceptable to have such high hopes, 
in hindsight it appears that these early 
expectations were terribly naïve. Unfortunately 
the multinational effort to alleviate poverty over 
the last half-century has not succeeded 
(Goodman, 2006). But does this mean we 
should give up hope? 
It is the intention of this article to show 
international development evaluators why, 
despite ongoing challenges and limited success 
thus far, there are several reasons for continued 
or renewed hope. It explains how evaluation 
can play a crucial role in alleviating poverty, not 
only by enhancing accountability and learning, 
but also by enabling wiser strategic planning and 
improved coordination. The article will 
recognize the many challenges involved in 
international development, explain why 
evaluators have such a heavy responsibility in 
this field, outline why there is a “window of 
opportunity” for evaluation to make a 
significant contribution in alleviating poverty, 
and explain what evaluators must do in order to 
meet their individual responsibilities, thus 
helping to insure that the evaluation profession 
delivers this high-potential contribution.  
It is important to recognize that global 
development and poverty reduction efforts are 
at a critical point at this stage in history. 
Humanity must now realize that further 
diffusion of last century’s technology and 
economic development methods across less 
developed areas of the globe is unsustainable. 
Although mere anticipation of future resource 
constraints is already hurting us as a result of 
dramatic price increases driven by speculative 
investors, we haven’t yet hit the limit on real 
fuel and food production capacity. Nonetheless, 
notwithstanding a successful new Earth-friendly 
“wave” of innovation able to overcome these 
looming resource limits while significantly 
enhancing sustainability and productive 
capacity, this limit will eventually be reached. If 
and when this happens, the potential for pro-
poor economic growth and development may 
disappear. Thus, there is a significant likelihood 
that alleviation of poverty may be a now-or-
never proposition. 
Therefore, given the limited success thus far 
and that time may be running out, it is critical 
that the status quo be no longer acceptable to 
the international development community and 
that a major turn-around effort be undertaken 
wherever possible and in ways that are 
environmentally appropriate and sustainable. 
Otherwise, if and when more severely limiting 
macro-constraints do set in, the problems may 
never get solved.   As a result of this dire 
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situation, we need to do all we can to ensure 
that the current generation of development 
efforts succeed. We need to use all available 
knowledge and resources as cost-effectively as 
possible to deliver high-impact aid. Given our 
severely limited success thus far, we have very 
little to gain and everything to lose by 
continuing with our old ways. We must 
aggressively seek, prove, and replicate new high-
impact solutions while resolutely ending 
lackluster performance. It is imperative for 
evaluators and managers of international growth 
and development to step up now and deliver 
what it takes to make the next half-century of 
development effort much more successful and 
sustainable than the last.  
 
Evaluation and Planning  
 
Traditional evaluation reports and journal 
articles are good at communicating the current 
state of theory and practice in evaluation, but 
they appear to fall short in communicating an 
overall understanding of what must be done for 
the transdiscipline of evaluation to reach its 
potential for contributing to the progress of 
society. This article attempts to partly fill this 
void in the context of international 
development aid and reconstruction—a massive 
multidisciplinary, multinational, multisector 
endeavor in which evaluation has played a 
relatively prominent, yet still too limited, role. 
Pragmatic principles traditionally followed in 
the field of strategic planning must be made 
more explicit in the field of international 
development. This means every effort must be 
taken to implement ex-ante Poverty Impact 
Assessment and Results-based Management 
techniques from the highest levels on down 
within the development community. Having 
used similar techniques for the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization in Vienna 
in the early 1980s and spending the bulk of the 
ensuing years in management systems 
consulting and integration services, I find the 
limited use of these techniques surprising and 
disappointing. Guiding principles of strategic 
planning, such as the consideration of 
comparative costs and benefits of various 
design options vis-à-vis immediate and 
extended opportunities and threats in the 
environment, appear to be mysteriously missing 
from the extensive array of evaluation literature 
and reports I’ve been exposed to. This has been 
true in international development and other 
areas where evaluation is prominent. As a result, 
I have concluded that the use of such sound 
strategic principles is not the modus operandi 
within evaluation circles, and that the 
transdiscipline of evaluation needs to make a 
concerted effort to apply such strategic planning 
principles if it is to reach its potential for high 
impact.  
On occasion there are signs that aid 
administrators are being asked to better address 
strategic issues in international development. 
Such is the case with the Paris Declarations that 
demand “local ownership,” “mutual 
accountability,” and “harmonization” in 
international development aid. These Paris 
Declarations address strategic critical success 
factors for international development assistance. 
They demand that the nations that receive 
development and reconstruction aid have 
ownership and that there is networkwide mutual 
accountability and harmonization between all 
parties involved in designing, implementing and 
evaluating development programs. 
Unfortunately though, evaluation has 
traditionally been viewed as something that is 
only done at the end of a program’s lifecycle. 
Therefore, the opportunity to include evaluation 
as an integral part of planning or design has 
been repeatedly forgone. Obviously, if 
evaluation is involved in ex-ante assessment of 
design options for the express purpose of 
leading to the development of high-impact 
program theories, logic models and monitoring 
systems, it is much more likely that 
accountability and harmonization will result. 
Why is it not, then, a number one priority to see 
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that evaluation is involved as an integral part of 
every program from the beginning?  
 
Example of High-Level Evaluation-
Driven Strategic Planning  
 
The extreme challenge of integrating aid and 
reconstruction efforts in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan demonstrates the dire need for 
evaluation to be more connected to strategic 
planning. Professional evaluation must take on 
this more strategically positioned role in order 
to be able to perform its critical function in 
guiding and coordinating both design and 
implementation of large reconstruction efforts. 
Regardless of whether one thinks the actions 
that led the United States into the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars were wise to begin with, it is 
now the responsibility of the United States, in 
conjunction with global partners, to do all it can 
to finish effectively. This means doing 
everything possible to ensure effective 
reconstruction. Anything less than acceptable 
results from these efforts will obviously have 
negative strategic ramifications, yet the complex 
multinational and multisector reconstruction 
efforts are daunting. Even though the number 
of lives and amount of resources lost on these 
wars has been staggering and are irreplaceable, 
at least not all will have been lost if 
reconstruction efforts are able to succeed.  
Perhaps infusing evaluative thinking about 
the significance and challenges involved in 
“winning the peace” and succeeding in 
reconstruction efforts would have made a 
difference in how the wars were originally 
carried out or even in the decision of whether 
the wars were in the strategic interests of United 
States to begin with. If the worth and 
significance of “winning the peace” were 
properly evaluated, then at least more emphasis 
would have been placed on these issues. If the 
critical yet daunting nature of achieving these 
aims, as well as our less-than-stellar history of 
success in aid and reconstruction, were 
considered in the assessment of opportunities 
and risks of these wars, it is possible that the 
initiators may have done otherwise. As 
referenced above, we don’t have the best track 
record in planned economic development 
interventions, even in relatively peaceful locales. 
Nonetheless, our success or failure will, for 
better or for worse, determine the message that 
will be communicated to the entire world 
through the history books. Can the world 
depend on the United States, its allies, and the 
socioeconomic models they espouse to improve 
these types of dire situations?   
Rather than expecting an easy victory, 
additional ex-ante evaluative thinking may have 
shed light on the likelihood that success in 
Afghanistan and Iraq would be costly and 
difficult. It may have also suggested that success 
or failure with these interventions would have a 
significant role in determining the fate of the 
United States in the new millennium. Pragmatic 
evaluation may have suggested that the upside 
potential of all-out war may very well not be 
worth the downside risk, and perhaps that 
“nation-building” efforts of this magnitude 
would distract attention and resources from 
other even more critical looming issues. The 
main line of thinking seemed to be that there 
was an immediate threat that required an 
immediate response and that the risks of 
intervention were minimal. It now appears that 
the threat was much less severe and that the 
challenges and risks of intervention were much 
more extreme than some realized. Perhaps we 
can consider it a lesson learned, but as will be 
discussed later, it is not a lesson learned unless 
real improvements result. Real improvement in 
this case would be that more effective 
evaluation on a more strategic level be done, 
especially prior to making critical “make or 
break” decisions. 
The most important question that will soon 
be answered and the message that will be heard 
loud and clear around the world is not whether 
we win or lose the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Though this is obviously important, the most 
important question is, should the type of free 
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and democratic economic and political systems 
the United States espouses continue to be 
considered the most viable and preferable path 
to global prosperity? It appears that part of the 
answer to this most significant question has 
already been answered. Humanity around the 
world, including those inside the United States, 
now appears to be relatively certain that the 
violent and disruptive interventionist brand of 
freedom and democracy is not the answer to 
our world’s problems. This suggests that we 
either need to find and support an alternative 
more effective and more humanitarian free and 
democratic approach, or even the fate of these 
great ideals will be at risk. This means our 
highest leaders need to take a new direction. 
They need to better evaluate our situation and 
quickly learn how to innovatively solve some 
huge global problems.  
At this juncture in history, it is absolutely 
critical that the democracies of the world unite 
to demonstrate our systematic ability to work 
together in innovative and peaceful ways as a 
positive force for international development 
and reconstruction. If we don’t succeed at this 
great commission, the extent to which our 
security, prosperity, and liberty is at risk has 
only just begun to be realized. So we should be 
less accepting of our leaders’ wayward ways that 
put us at increasing risk of failure and 
catastrophic loss in terms of our economic and 
political leadership position in the world. We 
need to innovate on a new, more strategic level. 
This means we need to improve our ability as a 
society to do effective pro-forma or ex-ante 
evaluation of opportunities and threats, assess 
our strengths and weaknesses, and do all that is 
necessary, including sacrificing our customary 
creature comforts, to solve huge and mounting 
problems. So the great commission of today is 
not to “protect our way of life” indiscriminately, 
but to demonstrate and protect a way of life 
that is free yet fair, creative yet conscientious, 
and democratic yet collectively responsible. This 
is the American way of life that made this 
nation great, that way of life that I know and 
love. We need to reassert this American way, 
remaining steadfast in these principles, while 
maintaining the flexibility to creatively modify 
or innovate plans and actions to fit changing 
realities. This more pragmatic and morally 
defensible way of life is not only worth 
demonstrating and protecting, but is also the 
way of life that rest of the world once admired 
about the United States and would once again 
be willing and able to help sustain. 
Pragmatic innovation is about learning and 
improvement; developing and using policies, 
programs, processes, and products that add 
more value in comparison to other alternatives; 
and satisfying performance needs with greater 
and more efficient benefit/cost ratios. 
Innovation in general demands innovation in 
evaluation. Evaluation must play a continuously 
formative role and be based on the type of 
pragmatic values that are both morally and 
strategically defensible. Good innovation means 
being more considerate of how our actions 
impact diverse aspects of society on both 
individual and global scales. We must not only 
consider the beliefs, attitudes, and values of 
those positioned upstream that are used to 
owning the leadership role in development and 
reconstruction efforts. We must also consider 
the impact on downstream intermediaries and 
target beneficiaries and, where possible, get 
them involved in governance as well. We must 
realize that only by helping those in need to lead 
more productive and prosperous lives, will the 
positive impact of multiplier effects be felt. 
Helping the poor lead more productive lives not 
only helps them directly, but also enables them 
to more productively help others, thus creating 
a multiplicative effect. Only then will aid 
resources flow both to target beneficiaries and 
on through to indirect impactees in their local 
communities and beyond. For example, more 
productive farmers not only improve their own 
household income, but also add additional value 
to their community by improving food security 
in their community.  
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Iraq and Afghanistan are just two of many 
examples of why the fate of freedom and 
democracy now depend on improved 
effectiveness in international aid and 
reconstruction. Yet the secret is out. Succeeding 
in the world of international development is 
tough. Although various exceptional examples 
and glimmers of hope remain, most everyone 
now knows that, at least historically, failure has 
been the norm. Evaluators must recognize the 
current situation as a historic opportunity to 
assume independence, speak truth to power, 
demand support for high quality evaluation and 
see to it that the results are heard loud and 
clear—not only in upper echelons of decision-
making power, but also out on the streets where 
real lives are actually touched.  
By taking on such a stronger and more 
essential role, evaluation can meet its promise of 
inspiring real humanitarian progress. But 
evaluators will still be required to help deliver 
on demands for beneficiary ownership, mutual 
accountability, collective learning, and 
harmonized coordination. How will monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) deliver on these 
heightened demands? This article will conclude 
with how evaluators might use new and 
improved M&E tools to appropriately meet 
these demands. The conclusion will also address 
whether there appears to be hope that existing 
and emerging evaluation models, tools, and 
methods can be combined with new policies— 
such as those reflected in the most recent Paris 
Declarations—to be enough to turn the tide 





What is making it so difficult to achieve more 
widespread success in international 
development aid? This question can be 
answered at least in part by looking at what is 
needed to perform adequately in this complex 
field. Is there something about the nature of 
international development aid that makes 
success particularly daunting? It is well known 
that there are, in fact, many challenges involved 
in international development aid that are not 
always present in other socioeconomic activities 
(Mansuri & Rao, 2004). Some of the critical 
success factors of international development 
that make aid particularly challenging include 
these: 
• Reduction in poverty and/or creation of 
economic development for those who 
are most needy or have the highest 
potential for socioeconomic 
improvement 
• Augmentation of market mechanisms 
with evaluation so as to insure that 
resources are apportioned appropriately 
• Empowerment of beneficiaries to 
become more self-sufficient in 
recognizing and developing their own 
opportunities 
• Adherence to ethical standards, e.g. 
transparent participation of all 
stakeholders in the process, that bolster 
viability and sustainability 
• Understanding of differing viewpoints, 
languages, capabilities, needs, and 
agendas of multiple governments, public 
and private donors, beneficiaries and 
other participants 
• Communication, negotiation, and 
cooperation through many 
intermediaries, including foreign 
governments and other partners in 
different cultures and languages 
• Synthesis of diverse stakeholder 
perspectives so as to reconcile 
differences and inspire voluntary 
cooperation by all involved 
• Satisfying equitable distribution of 
resources, offerings, incentives, and 
other means while simultaneously 
channeling and motivating a most cost-
effective positive impact 
• Handling the complex logistics of 
managing projects spread throughout 
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extended networks across multiple 
regions of the world 
• Coordination of increasingly complex 
partnership networks prevalent in 
international aid, development, and 
reconstruction 
• Encouragement of transparent or open 
communication of plans and results 
when there is a tendency for each 
institution/agency to be secretive and 
proprietary  
• Achievement of optimum balance in the 
distribution of resources and satisfaction 
of differing needs and agendas within 
and between various parts and levels of 
the greater system or global economy 
 
All these requirements for success make it 
understandable why we have not achieved the 
eradication of poverty in the ten- to fifteen-year 
timeframe that Rogers (2004) had anticipated 
Consider the last requirement alone. To 
successfully move towards optimum 
distribution of resources in a global economy 
involves self-organization of a complex system 
incorporating multiple individual participants at 
multiple organizational, sector, and national 
levels. Ideally, a global innovation system could 
be designed that would marshal all the force 
international development efforts could muster. 
This global innovation system would use 
evaluation to guide decision making and effect 
results in such a way that total impact on the 
distribution of costs and benefits of innovation 
were better managed. More should be done to 
ensure that all significant change initiatives are 
as informed as possible in anticipating both 
positive and negative effects of potential 
changes and that this information is used to 
manage these efforts to optimize benefits and 
their fair distribution throughout society. See 
the following exhibit (Figure 1) to get an idea of 
the complexity of this undertaking: 
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Figure 1. Cultural effects on costs and benefits of innovation 
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With all of this complexity and these 
challenging requirements for success in 
international development aid and 
reconstruction, one can’t help but wonder how 
any aid project ever works, let alone a whole 
program, policy, or greater effort. These 
complex requirements make success difficult no 
matter how the international development 
assistance community is organized. These 
challenges add much volatility, uncertainty, and 
ambiguity to planning efforts while also making 
it unrealistic to expect free-market mechanisms 
to operate efficiently. Too complex to be totally 
planned and too disjointed, immature, and/or 
broken to be self-sustaining, international 
development assistance needs new approaches 
to evaluation and management that allow the 
fluid integration of networkwide planning and 
entrepreneurial networking across traditional 
boundaries. Only then will international 
development assistance have a chance of 
success in the face of these tremendous 
challenges.  
In a nutshell, we need innovative models, 
mechanisms, and methods to support effective 
evaluation, management, and coordination of 
networkwide innovation. These are needed to 
bridge the gaps between planning and 
implementation, both within organizations and 
between organizations, both at each level of 
aggregation (or resolution) and between. We 
need systematic evaluation capable of 
facilitating and encouraging as much bottom-up 
participation of end beneficiaries as possible, 
e.g., like a free market where consumer voting 
with their dollars drives the system. Yet we also 
need systematic evaluation capable of 
facilitating proactive strategic planning and 
major resource allocation decision making that 
is mindful of the best interests of society in 
general, e.g., evaluation where consideration of 
the social value of satisfying unmet performance 
potentials of the neediest of society is the 
driving force. By guiding multidirectional 
decision making and resource flows with 
actionable information, new age evaluation will 
serve its role in facilitating an enhanced system 
that works for the benefit of the whole as well 
as all the individual parts. 
 
Extraordinary Demands on 
Evaluation in International Aid and 
Reconstruction 
 
As a result of the above real challenges, a 
system of evaluation designed to adequately 
function within the complex and dynamic 
environment of international development aid 
must support particularly heavy demands. This 
is especially true if development programs are 
expected to innovate where and when 
appropriate. It is as if Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
Principle of physics applies here, too. If 
evaluation does not more effectively identify 
and measure situations where both current 
problems and potential opportunities exist, then 
ineffective efforts will continue as they do and 
potential high-impact efforts will lack funding. 
In general this inability to make good 
formative and summative decisions is the major 
problem that results from inadequate 
evaluation. Specifically, in terms of the 
extraordinary demands on evaluation in the field 
of international aid where the responsibility is to 
serve the critical requirements of the most 
needy, failure to make good decisions results in 
traumatic suffering and even death on a massive 
scale. Unfortunately, the persistence of poverty 
seems to suggest that, given the historic 
capabilities of international development aid 
efforts, the challenges have thus far proven to 
be too great to overcome (Goodman, 2006). As 
mentioned earlier, this inability to reach the 
goals of the development community reflects 
badly on those nations funding the global effort 
and suggests the possibility that the challenge 
may be too great, especially the longer it takes.  
One overarching challenge is that success in 
pro-poor international development often must 
be achieved without the benefit of fluid 
functional market mechanisms. Involvement in 
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any grant-based or subsidized work normally 
lacks the market mechanisms for guiding 
appropriate resource allocation and other 
actions. Also, the standard “watchdogs” that 
might normally identify problems are usually 
nonfunctional in the international development 
arena. For example, there is often neither 
sufficient democratic processes, press coverage, 
regulatory oversight, nor peer review to hold 
those involved accountable. 
Since market and other mechanisms often 
cannot be relied on to ensure satisfactory 
performance of those involved in international 
development assistance, effective provisioning 
of goods and services does not happen in a self-
organizing or free-market kind of way. In 
situations where more developed or functional 
mechanisms exist, participants are guided and 
motivated by the potential for reward and 
punishment, e.g., profit and loss. Since these 
mechanisms are not normally present in 
international development aid, the public relies 
heavily on evaluation to guide decision making. 
Sure, there has been a relatively successful 
movement to stimulate market mechanisms in 
international development, e.g., micro finance 
and other “social entrepreneur” types of 
mechanisms, but only so much is possible when 
there is not a functional market and/or 
actionable information to guide resource 
allocation decisions at the various points in  
international development aid value chains. 
Value chains, in this context, are defined as the 
complex channels through which resources, 
including information, flow up and downstream 
to the various actors and impactees in 
international aid and reconstruction to assist in 
development and thus create value. In 
traditional aid efforts, the competition is not for 
individual, end-consumer dollars, as in most 
functional or free markets. Rather, the 
competition is for grant and other nonmarket 
funding at national and organizational levels.  
The ultimate sources of aid funds, i.e. 
taxpayers or gift-givers in developed nations, are 
normally disconnected from the programs, 
projects, and beneficiaries needing the funds. 
The taxpaying citizens of donor nations are 
usually so far removed from development work 
that it is difficult for them to be informed 
enough to hold aid administrators accountable. 
Those end beneficiaries targeted with aid efforts 
are usually not in a position to insist on high 
quality at a reasonable cost, as an end customer 
would be in a situation where the market and 
other mechanisms are more functional. The fact 
that end beneficiaries are usually receiving 
products and services for free or at highly 
subsidized prices makes it difficult for them to 
be demanding. As a result, the upstream donor 
agencies, as well as nations receiving aid and in-
country agencies, all remain somewhat insulated 
from normal market scrutiny.  
One way to improve this situation is to 
facilitate adequate participation from these 
extreme ends of the international development 
value chain. Plausible efforts should be made to 
create functional market and other mechanisms 
whereby donors behave like discerning 
investors and aid recipients like informed 
customers. Of course having donor agencies act 
as banks has been a mainstream traditional 
approach, but there remained limits to the 
extent this analogy. The question remains to be 
answered how far donors can be seen as 
investors and beneficiaries as customers. The 
recent example of Kiva, the micro-loan 
organization that uses the Web to connect 
individual micro-lenders from developed 
countries with individual entrepreneurial 
borrowers in developing countries, is an 
example of how this analogy can be extended 
and challenges overcome in new ways. 
Traditional bilateral and multilateral donor 
groups should consider new ideas and 
experiment with plausible ideas or innovative 
approaches to develop the market and other 
mechanisms that are lacking.  
There are other issues beyond the lack of 
market and watchdog mechanisms that might 
limit motivation for improvement or curtail 
such innovation. Complexities traditionally 
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involved in international development aid not 
only make it possible for many things to go 
wrong but, also make it possible for there to be 
many ways to hide what goes wrong. Based on 
reviewing many program and project evaluation 
reports, it appears that failed projects often go 
unnoticed and continue to consume precious 
funding, e.g., see evaluations of water provision 
in Indonesian or Sordic land reclamation in 
India. It seems that the facts about results are 
often presented in inaccurate, possibly in even 
misleading and/or hidden, ways. It seems 
professional evaluators have historically, for 
various reasons, missed opportunities to set the 
record straight and contribute to either 
improvement or discontinuance of wayward 
efforts. Some experienced critics of 
international aid evaluation think this is caused 
by a tendency of evaluators to desire to appease 
their donor agency clients. The argument 
suggests that evaluators often will think that 
providing noncritical evaluations will make it 
more likely that they will be rehired, and as a 
result, there is a temptation to make evaluations 
less critical. It is true that evaluators often don’t 
seem to be asking the tough questions that 
would shed light on the major problems going 
undetected. Whether this is intentional or due 
to some other systemic reason is an open 
question. Regardless of the cause, there is no 
denial that it has been common historically for 
donor organizations and evaluators to not insist 
on M&E processes and systems that demand 
high performance and support results based 
management practices. Whether for technical or 
other reasons, they don’t even seem to give 
priority to providing the support necessary to 
make sure these systems are put in place. The 
reviewed cases showed that when funding was 
specifically provided for monitoring and other 
managerial control systems to be developed, 
these efforts were unsuccessful. At least from a  
metaevaluator's perspective, they rarely derived 
any real benefit from such efforts, for example 
in the form of better data.  
Even when the data needed to estimate 
costs are available, for example in the reviewed 
Sordic lands case in India and primary schools 
efforts in Bangladesh, there was either an 
avoidance or inability to use the data available 
to do or present a clear cost/benefit, cost-
effectiveness or other socioeconomic impact 
analysis. Reviews of historical evaluation 
reporting practices have shown that even 
evaluators that do some impact analysis, such as 
in the case of a water project in Indonesia, it 
appears that numbers have been either modified 
or presented in such a way that they do not take 
into account major costs that dramatically 
impact project viability or sustainability. 
Estimated costs, regardless of how rough or 
who is intended pay them, should normally be 
included in evaluations, and yet, for example, 
costs of ongoing maintenance to keep funded 
utility systems functional are often omitted. 
Also, even many evaluators that have the 
information available to do complete impact 
analyses, such as in the example of a feeder 
roads project in Nepal, do not do or include the 
recommended analyses in their reports. 
Evaluators often suggest that the necessary 
information is not available. Although this does 
often appear to be the case, it also often appears 
that this excuse is used even in cases where the 
necessary information to do rough, but 
nonetheless highly informative analyses is 
available (Clements, 2005). 
Evaluators should try to live by the motto 
of John Maynard Keynes who said, “I’d rather 
be approximately correct than exactly wrong.” 
Whether these errors or omissions are on 
purpose or the result of ignorance, such lack of 
professionalism should not be tolerated in 
international development evaluation. 
Unfortunately, it is still possible for problems 
with donor agencies, receiving governments, 
and other partners to go unnoticed by 
evaluators. Therefore, these problematic 
policies, programs, and projects continue. 
Although this less-than-optimum allocation of 
resources appears to be prevalent historically, 
Ronald S. Visscher 




there also appears to be some improvements 
lately. Some experienced individuals have even 
accused banks of having a bias for larger 
programs that use more money, rather than 
smaller, more easily managed and evaluated 
projects. As long as less developed governments 
desperately need financing, the temptation to 
support unworthy programs will likely continue. 
Donor banks and receiving countries can spend 
more effort, particularly by involving evaluators 
more in the ex-ante strategic planning and 
proposal evaluation stages. This will help ensure 
that funds are expended on programs and 
projects that are more properly targeted and 
managed.  
There fortunately is an increase in demand 
for more and better impact evaluation. It is 
encouraging to see that these demands are 
coming from all parts of the development 
community and there is a global initiative to 
encourage results based evaluation and 
management in international development. 
Unfortunately there is also currently not any 
good mechanism to make sure these 
improvements in aid evaluation get done across 
the globe in a consistent manner. On a related 
note, little independent meta-evaluation 
(evaluation of evaluation) is currently being 
done. As a result of this lack of a credible self-
policing effort on the part of the evaluation 
profession and the fact that market-based and 
other watchdog mechanisms are also missing, 
there is a severe accountability and learning gap 
in the field of international development. 
Additionally, it would help tremendously to 
compare and learn from different projects in 
similar sectors if there was a meta-evaluation 
and meta-analysis initiative to share best 
practices, such as sector specific evaluation 
templates, and aggregate results in a consistent 
way. Evaluation must fill this gap if it is to fulfill 
its obligation to the global community. For this 
and other reasons it is recommended that an 
independent international development 
evaluators association or guild be established. 
This group would promote professional 
evaluation standards as well as the use of sector 
specific and cross-sector integration frameworks 
for inter-project comparison and coordination. 
This group would be initiated and governed by 
qualified independent evaluators. These and 
other opportunities for improvement are 




There is much that can be done to improve 
monitoring and evaluation and its impact on 
strategic planning and other managerial 
functions. As a result, there is hope that this 
unfortunate current situation can be turned 
around. It has been suggested that we need to 
admit where we have failed, realize the 
challenges, and be realistic in our strategies and 
plans to overcome them, i.e., take into greater 
consideration the specific needs and capabilities 
of aid recipient countries (Goodman, 2006). 
The amount of information about poor 
performance of international aid is more 
prevalent lately, and this is an indication that 
evaluation information does reach the public, 
even when it is not good news. This will likely 
lead to increased scrutiny and demand for 
accountability on the part of the public. It is 
already occurring to a greater extent in countries 
like the Netherlands, where the government 
allocates more than one percent of the GDP— 
or, per capita, the largest rate in the world—to 
spending on foreign aid. It is healthy for such 
information to be made public through the 
press, so that pressure will be placed on the 
development community to improve. Then 
perhaps agencies and others involved in aid 
program administration will be forced to take 
evaluation more seriously and better learn from 
experience how to improve performance.  
The reason the Paris Declarations of mutual 
accountability, country ownership, and 
harmonization make sense from a strategic 
point of view is that if these demands can be 
accomplished, many of the challenges identified 
above will be able to be resolved. But this will 
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only happen if needed M&E mechanisms are 
present. It is well known that activities that are 
measured tend to get done. By involving ex-ante 
evaluation in the planning stages and by using 
evaluation as a conduit of actionable 
information between monitoring and planning, 
evaluation has a real opportunity to make a 
significant difference in international 
development and poverty reduction. As a result 
of evaluators taking on the roles of connecting 
planning and monitoring functions, i.e., 
evaluation becoming involved in earlier phases 
of resource allocation and program design 
lifecycle, both within and between traditional 
organizational bounds, international 
development efforts will be more likely to be 
modified and improved when they need to be. 
This will then enable substantial gains from 
evaluation, gains that would result from 
redeployment or improved allocation of 
resources to more productive investments or 
undertakings.  
 
Example of World Bank Training 
and Visit Program 
 
An example of how some of these changes have 
taken place is the case of the World Bank’s 
Training and Visit (T&V) agricultural extension 
program, specifically the programs projects in 
Kenya (World Bank, 2000). Although the results 
of the program turned out to be dismal, this 
experience actually provides hope that the 
necessary determination finally exists to change 
the way evaluation gets done with an increase 
emphasis on impact or results-based 
management. Unfortunately, it wasn’t until after 
several hundred million dollars were invested in 
the T&V program over a period of fifteen years 
that mounting dissatisfaction finally prompted 
an impact evaluation. The administrators of the 
improved impact evaluation were from a newly 
reorganized and renamed group of internal 
independent evaluators at the Bank. This new 
internal group within the World Bank eventually 
did do a serious and relatively unbiased 
evaluation of the T&V program’s projects in 
Kenya (World Bank, 2000).  
Based on a comparative metaevaluation of 
this impact evaluation vs. other evaluations 
sponsored by the World Bank, there appears to 
be improvement. Perhaps the reorganization of 
the role for coordinating evaluation into this 
new internal group with authority to 
transparently publish bad news such as the 
T&V studies is actually encouraging. As a result 
of this impact evaluation, it was found that no 
benefit had resulted from the project and all the 
invested time and money was wasted. It is now 
recognized that much wasted time and 
resources could have been saved if impact 
evaluation was done earlier. If corrections could 
have been made early on in the program 
lifecycle, hundreds of millions of dollars could 
have been saved. Perhaps the earning potential 
of 4.4 million farmers and food security of the 
whole nation of Kenya could have been 
improved. The willingness of the World Bank 
to admit such failure and be open about the 
need to resolve major problems provides hope 
and signifies a real opportunity for evaluators in 
the international development community. The 
community needs to learn from this and many 
other similar experiences. First of all, there was 
what might appear to be a logical plan or 
framework prior to embarking on the program, 
but due to unanticipated problems (such as 
those mentioned in the “Challenge” section of 
this article), the program was not implemented 
according to this plan. There were aspects of 
the plan that did not work out in practice. 
Unfortunately, as a result of evaluation not 
being involved at an earlier stage in planning 
and monitoring of beginning and interim 
process and outcome indicators, it is not known 
whether this failure was due to program design, 
feasibility, or management effectiveness, but in 
either case better M&E at earlier stages of the 
program lifecycle could have provided the 
guidance necessary to prevent this major fiasco.  
 
 
Ronald S. Visscher 




Learning from the Past 
 
By enabling improved measurement and 
recognition of performance, particularly in the 
case of extraordinary successes and failures, and 
by encouraging the use of this information as 
early in the lifecycle of development efforts as 
possible, evaluation can help programs learn 
from experience and improve as a result. This 
ability to facilitate learning from past 
experience, whether from one’s own experience 
or that of others, can be the most efficient path 
to significant progress as long as recognized 
opportunities for improvement are put into 
practice. There are signs of greater openness to 
learning from the past among evaluators and 
their constituents, but it still appears to be too 
arduous to modify current practice and 
implement lessons learned. Whether developing 
entirely new solutions or adopting the successes 
of others, somehow lessons of the past need to 
be more readily incorporated into future action. 
This is known as the innovation process. On a 
larger scale it is known as the national 
innovation system. It is the ability to perform 
well at this innovation process or the ability to 
learn better than your competitors that is 
known to be the main source of sustainable 
comparative advantage in an increasingly 
competitive and ever-changing world. This 
innovation process has not been well performed 
within the international development 
community to date.  
Looking again at the high-profile case 
example of the World Bank T&V Program in 
Kenya, a case can easily be made that although 
cancellation of a nonperforming project is 
better than doing nothing, it would have been 
much better if the program could have been 
improved as it was being developed, pilot-
tested, and rolled-out. Involvement of decent 
ex-ante and concurrent formative evaluation in 
these earlier processes could provide real 
improvement and progress. The potential to 
better achieve accountability and improved 
practice in the field is real.  
Some of the following recommendations 
were part of the original goals of the program 
design, some were lessons learned as a result of 
the evaluation, and others were only suggested 
as part of a metaevaluation done by this author. 
Unfortunately, none of them were achieved. 
Because of the lack of an effective monitoring 
system with interim indicators, program 
participants and administrators were not held 
accountable or provided with midterm guidance 
on areas that needed attention. Thus, corrective 
actions were not taken, and the goals were not 
achieved. By monitoring midterm progress 
based on interim indicators of performance in 
these areas and keeping track of exemplary 
solutions, many of these issues could probably 
have been solved, and the outcome and impact 
of the program could have been entirely 
different. Success factors included these: 
 
• Retargeting resources to poorer areas or 
areas with the most potential for growth 
(a monitoring system should be 
implemented that identifies gaps 
between potential and actual 
performance in the field so that efforts 
can be targeted to meet real potential 
for value creation) 
• Feedback mechanisms that enable 
training messages to be better 
customized to fit unique economic 
situation, geography, and technological 
needs, rather than “one package fit all” 
• Organizational culture and structure 
should be developed that is less top-
heavy, more responsive to farmer 
capabilities and needs from the bottom 
up.  
• More up-front planning of resource 
allocation based on the beneficiary 
needs and capabilities, using the 
information gained from the monitoring 
system mentioned in the first point 
above as a basis for guiding project 
planning and budgeting of time and 
other resources (e.g., Should effort be 
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placed on penetrating certain areas 
and/or expansion of effort into new 
territories or opportunities?) 
• Adaptation of service intensity based on 
rate of innovation and potential yield 
gains (e.g., Should focus be on achieving 
same field gains or leaner coverage of 
greater territory?) 
• Encourage involvement of private 
sector, NGOs, and other partners. 
• Coordinate efforts of donor, 
government, sector, and other 
institutions in the community. 
• Empower beneficiary farmers by giving 
them a voice and creating functional 
new feedback links for 
problem/opportunity recognition and 
resolution  
• Decentralize delivery and managerial 
control systems through local farmer 
cooperatives. 
 
There is still much work to be done to 
determine how the above recommendations can 
be successfully implemented. Recommending 
action plans is one thing. Actually putting the 
plans into practice is another. More research 
should be done into what has been done to 
rectify the agricultural extension programs in 
Kenya since the old T&V program was 
canceled. In the past, without early involvement 
of evaluation and a monitoring system to check 
on progress, even recommended improvements 
recognized as necessary have often not been 
addressed. Potential changes based on lessons 
learned must be pilot-tested, improved, and 
rolled out elsewhere where appropriate. Every 
seasoned evaluator knows how disappointing it 
can be to see seemingly good ideas for 
improvement end in the idea stage.  
There should be a concerted effort on the 
part of program headquarters to support field 
personnel in doing more to try new solutions 
and rewarding them when they succeed. Of 
course, these trials should take place in such a 
way that sufficient evidence of their impact is 
provided; this should be a major role of 
extension field workers—, tracking 
environmental, treatment, and yield changes 
with farmers over time. A sufficient variety of 
different approaches need to be tried in the field 
on small scales. When small-scale trials appear 
to have positive effects, scale should gradually 
be increased, with interim indicators providing 
positive and negative feedback loops into the 
decision-making process that determines further 
penetration and/or spread of various 
treatments. An extension service capable of 
such continuous improvement will be most 
capable of responding to environmental 
changes. Such a learning organization is only 
possible with the effective M&E systems.  
The most valuable form of learning is when 
such lessons learned are generalizable and 
applicable (or exportable) across other contexts, 
including different types of beneficiaries, project 
configurations, cultural settings, and times. With 
this in mind, it is important to keep track of 
these differences between trials, evaluating 
results of unique combinations, recognizing 
highly effective combinations, and 
communicating the results. This is what 
innovation is about—continuous improvement 
that considers a sufficiently diverse array of 
potential approaches. The transferability of an 
idea to other settings enhances its significance 
or potential impact, thus the potential for this 
should be evaluated whenever possible. This is 
the basis of one of the primary 
recommendations given in a 2007 presentation 
at the American Evaluation Association 
conference by this author and others in the 
International Development Interest Group at 
The Evaluation Center at Western Michigan 
University on the modification of the common 
evaluation criteria used in international 
development. It was recommended that the 
OECD DAC (the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development’s Development 
Assistance Committee) criteria be modified to 
include exportability and/or generalizability for 
these reasons.  
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The community of international 
development evaluators needs to play a stronger 
role in helping development agencies, such as 
the World Bank, build on their improved 
accountability initiatives by doing its part in 
assisting in the learning and improvement 
process. This means evaluators need to insist on 
being present at the table in earlier stages, e.g., 
planning and design. Evaluators need to have a 
voice in seeing that past lessons resulting from 
past evaluations are appropriately applied in the 
early design stages of future projects. In order 
to facilitate this type of intelligent ex-ante 
evaluation and planning, evaluators need to 
ensure that there is a concerted effort placed on 
the systematic metaevaluation and meta-analysis 
of past evaluations and potential uses of results. 
Evaluators need to set in place an unbiased 
structure for facilitating movement toward 
trying a variety of promising treatments and 
propagating lessons learned so they materialize 
into improvement of development efforts and 
real progress.  
Again, this suggests the importance of an 
independent guild or association of professional 
international development evaluators, one that 
is organized based on the principle of being 
independent of any nation, method, 
organization and/or culture. It should focus on 
the mission of facilitating flexible adaptation of 
the most appropriate evaluation methods and 
frameworks for each situation while still 
enabling harmonized metaevaluated and meta-
analyzed results to be efficiently and effectively 
synthesized and reapplied earlier in the design 
process. This is possible given metamodels, 
tools, and methods that are now emerging. The 
author of this article has invented one such 
approach to making this possible, the technical 
details of which has been made public, yet are 
too voluminous to be covered in this article. 
Those interested learning more about these 
developments should e-mail the author of this 
article at ronald.s.visscher@wmich.edu. Suffice 
it to say that, regardless of the specific 
approaches taken to accomplish the advanced 
aims of this professional association, if these 
aims are accomplished and the evaluation 
profession is repositioned to play a more 
significant role in earlier stages of international 
development efforts, the results of our 
collective evaluation efforts will be dramatically 
improved.  
Context-sensitive professional standards 
and benchmarks will be established that provide 
better guidance for how to go about evaluation 
that achieves sufficiently reliable and valid 
results, given cost constraints and other aspects 
of each given context. And the results will be 
more readily usable at the point where they can 
make the highest impact. By encouraging more 
appropriate and effective application of 
evaluation models, tools, and methods for 
particular contexts, the independent 
international development evaluators 
association will serve to strengthen the value of 
doing evaluation as well as the credibility of the 
collective voice of evaluators involved in 
international development. This will help 
marshal the resources and influence necessary 
to enable evaluators to engage in the sort of 
follow-up, lesson learning, and dissemination 
described above that is necessary for real 
progress in the eradication of poverty. In this 
way, increased continuity and coordination of 
global development effort can be achieved. 
There will be even more hope for inspiring 
whole-hearted participation of all the necessary 
constituents or stakeholders in the achievement 
of our common cause.  
This advanced type of professional 
evaluators’ guild or association would serve to 
promote more effective top-down, bottom-up, 
and horizontal cooperation among clusters of 
participants throughout international 
development value chains. For example, 
collaboration would be enhanced in the 
comparison of the cost-effectiveness of 
different means for specific ends. Regardless of 
sector or region of the world, by tracking the 
commonalities and differences between the 
settings and treatment effects of different 
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policies, programs, and projects in a 
harmonious way, complexity can be more 
readily considered and results more effectively 
applied in different situations. Also, as a result 
of these advancements in the evaluation 
profession, coordination of communitywide 
implementation, through sectorwide and other 
collaborative multipartner approaches, will be 
dramatically improved. By working more 
efficiently and effectively together, evaluators 
will better facilitate the type of coordinated 
effort among evaluators and constituents that 
will be necessary to better organize and 
harmonize international development efforts. In 
this way evaluators, both individually and 
collectively as a profession, can do their part in 
enabling real progress in international 
development. Evaluation will then be able to 
assert its role in helping facilitate the 
cooperation in planning new projects and 
programs that is necessary to ensure that 
lessons are actually learned and put into 
practice. Best practices in networkwide 
innovation will become commonplace.  
So in summary, the following conditions 
have created a historic opportunity for aid 
evaluation to achieve success: 
 
• Realization that the fate of freedom and 
democracy are dependent on success 
• Improvements in results-based 
monitoring and recognition of success 
and failure 
• Improved organizational learning and 
coordination processes based on 
embedded evaluation 
• Better methods for adaptation of 
development efforts to unmet needs 
and potential 
• New political and public determination 
for seeking change and real progress 
• Increased call for involvement of 
evaluation at earlier stages of 
development efforts 
• Explicit declaration of what is needed to 
achieve real improvement and progress 
 
Given the above discussion of the 
challenges, it does make sense that local 
ownership; mutual accountability; and 
harmonization of evaluation, learning, and 
implementation processes are the opportunities 
for improvement. It boils down to the issue of 
using evaluation to nurture social capital. 
Overcoming the challenges and achieving the 
opportunities with real solutions that create 
sustainable development and eradicate poverty 
depends on having an adequately developed 
social platform for the healthy democratic 
processes necessary to ensure liberty and justice, 
honest dialogue, discourse, and inclusiveness 
(House & Howe, 1999). No matter how great 
the intentions and integrity of those involved in 
development, given the complexity, volatility, 
uncertainty and ambiguity of innovation and 
economic development systems, the capacity 
for informed and effective action is only as 
great as the capacity for evaluative 
communication. No matter how great the 
determination for progress— and in this case, 
no matter how great the potential for pro-poor 
growth—efforts will be limited by the extended 
community’s networkwide ability to satisfy the 
requirements for recognizing, measuring, 
understanding, evaluating, and communicating 
innovative opportunities for improvement and 




So how do we improve coordination across the 
international development assistance 
community, including taxpayers, and aid 
recipients? How do we bring donor groups, 
government agencies, local institutions, and aid 
recipients together? How do we enable better 
communication of opportunities for real 
development, value creation, and progress? 
How do we improve networkwide coordination 
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of implementation and actualization of these 
opportunities for creating real value? 
  
Evaluation as the Conscience and 
Inspiration of Development 
 
Evaluative information can be an important 
source for building vision and consensus and 
for inspiring commitment and action for a 
cause. For the sake of the needy and the long-
term viability of international aid, new solutions 
must be found to improve availability and use 
of evaluative information. Better M&E tools are 
necessary for embedding evaluation capacity 
throughout value chains. Evaluation must hold 
parties involved in international development 
aid accountable for their behavior. Did 
everyone involved in the development project 
know what each participant was willing and able 
to do? Did they follow through on doing their 
parts? And was there timely interim feedback on 
how things were going, as well as ex-post 
evaluation to determine success and failure? 
Actionable evaluative information is the needed 
solution. Now more than ever, effective 
evaluation is needed to help participants better 
cooperate in making efforts successful. 
In order for evaluation to be able to take on 
its role as the “conscience” of socioeconomic 
development, professional international 
development evaluators must 
  
• assume independence 
• “speak truth to power” 
• marshal support for providing and using 
high quality evaluation throughout 
program lifecycles 
• promote cost-effective use of evaluation 
resources, encouraging best design for 
context 
o use controls when the estimated 
cost-benefit appears to justify it 
o consider diversity, ethicality, 
complexity, reliability, validity, 
and generalizability 
• create an independent international 
development evaluation association 
(IIDEA) 
• harmonize structures to enhance mutual 
transparency and accountability so 
multi- organizational, sectoral, and 
national partnerships can coordinate 
collective efforts 
o share knowledge using common 
yet flexible information 
architectures  
• promote cooperation, learning, and 
innovation among interdependent 
participants 
o aligning logic model and cost-
effectiveness frameworks to 
provide guidance  
o inspire upfront agreement on 
resource allocations and 
evaluation criteria, enhancing 
cooperation by solving problems 
resulting from poor 
communication 
• require local recipient responsibility for 
performance and ownership of results 
o create systems that motivate 
desirable behavior and account 
for actual contributions 
o provide incentives or rewards 
for satisfying needs and meeting 
development goals 
• use new tools that are able to facilitate 
these and other needed improvements 
o cost effectively collect actionable 
data and enable shared creation 
and enhancement of ex-ante 
standard setting and impact 
assessments 
o target features and costs of 
development assistance to 
beneficiary potential for adding 
economic value and creating 
multiplier effects.  
 
In these ways, strategic planning, evaluation, 
and monitoring will be able to deliver on their 
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potential for setting and meeting increasingly 
heightened performance demands in eradicating 
poverty.  
In general, there are two primary messages 
that all evaluators should work to communicate 
to all constituents of evaluation. The first 
message is that evaluation (in conjunction with 
the strategic planning and operational 
monitoring that makes effective evaluation 
possible) is not about placing individual blame, 
but about collective accountability, learning, 
coordination, and innovation. Evaluation is the 
means through which humanity can harmonize 
its efforts to achieve progress. The 
unobstructed flow of both good and bad news 
is essential in order to achieve increasingly 
positive results.  
The second most critical message we as 
evaluators need to communicate is that 
evaluation must be involved earlier in policy, 
program, and project lifecycles, participating in 
the ex-ante proposal and design phases where 
our contributions have maximum impact. Sure 
we need ex-post summative evaluators that are 
willing to speak truth to power with the 
advantage of hindsight; but even more 
importantly, we need a new breed of ex-ante 
evaluators that are adept at bringing the models, 
tools, and methods of evaluation to the more 
strategic decision-making processes located in 
earlier stages. Only by being involved in early 
stages, taking baseline readings and producing 
frameworks for eventual process and impact 
evaluation and guidance, will pragmatic 
evaluators produce the knowledge and 
actionable information needed for real progress, 
the wisdom that can be brought to bear on 
decision-making processes across the value 
chains of international development efforts. 
Only then will individual evaluators and the 
collective profession of evaluators reach their 
potential for making a positive impact on 
solving our global predicaments. Evaluation has 
a major role to play in solving global problems, 
and in order to do so, individual evaluators need 
to be more proactive in seeing that they are 
positioned to help guide planning and design at 
a more strategic level.  
For this reason, it is welcome news that 
evaluation leadership, such as the new president 
of the American Evaluation Association, 
William Trochim, are encouraging greater 
emphasis on the role of evaluation in policy 
making.  
Progress results from individual actions, but 
some individuals have more impact than others. 
Leaders by their very nature have an inordinate 
amount of influence on whether society 
progresses or not. At least in a democracy, 
regular folks have the freedom and 
responsibility to determine who these leaders 
are and to influence their actions. Whether 
leaders are of associations, governments, 
academic institutions, or industrial corporations, 
these individuals are setting the policies that 
support the programs that design the projects 
that determine the quality of everyday life. 
Leaders inspire informed action from the 
bottom up and make or break progress.  
Everyone in a free and democratic society 
needs to know that it is human capacity for 
evaluation, by and through both the public at 
large and upper-level decision makers, that 
enables the proper functioning of “the 
conscience of freedom and democracy” 
(Visscher, 2007). By incorporating democratic 
values and processes, such as inclusion, 
discourse, and deliberation in evaluation, the 
evaluation profession nurtures ethical debate in 
society (House & Howe, 1999). By nurturing 
public debate from the top down, from the 
bottom up, and across traditionally divided 
boundaries, evaluation will dramatically 
strengthen the social capital of a society.  
By taking our individual and collective 
responsibilities seriously, evaluators working in 
all socioeconomic sectors and localities can help 
the international development aid community as 
well as society in general to nurture a healthy 
attitude toward international development, one 
that is idealistic in terms of intentions, 
professional in terms of recognizing and 
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insisting on cost-effective results, and realistic in 
terms of budgeting and expectations. By 
positioning evaluation between planning or 
budgeting functions on the one hand and 
accounting or controller functions on the other, 
evaluation will be better connected with both of 
these and better able to play its role as the 
conduit of learning and the conscience of 
action. If evaluation can play a greater role in 
connecting together the planning and 
controlling aspects of human enterprise, the 
evaluation profession will not only maximize its 
positive impact on society but also find it easier 
to justify the cost of good evaluation. As a bi-
product of improving the positioning of 
evaluation, the higher level of use of evaluation 
results that will ensue will also greatly enhance 
and promote the impact of evaluation theory 
and practice.  
As the conduit of information on the merit, 
worth, and significance of individual and 
collective humanitarian efforts, evaluation can 
promote understanding of the most effective 
roles each individual constituent can play in 
particular development efforts and thus also 
play an instrumental role in motivating 
cooperation and coordination of collaborative 
efforts. Individual donors and taxpayers in 
developed countries want to know they are 
supporting high-impact efforts. All participants 
involved in complex multinational development 
value chains must have the evaluative 
information they need to prioritize and motivate 
their individual actions that contribute to 
coordinated collective efforts.  
Across extended networks, the evaluation 
function will better satisfy its responsibility for 
maintaining the complex feedback loop that 
keeps cyclical or iterative learning and 
improvement processes flowing for optimum 
performance. Starting at the proposal stage, 
representatives of each party expected to 
participate in a value chain, including intended 
beneficiaries, need to be transparently aware of 
relevant successes and failures of the past, as 
well as today’s position in terms of unmet needs 
that can be readily translated into goals and 
objectives for tomorrow. They need to have 
convenient access to the information needed to 
consider, negotiate, and consent to expected 
costs and intended benefits and to vet 
agreement on the equitable distribution of 
anticipatable positive and negative tradeoffs. In 
this way, ethical and wise collective decisions 
can be made on where to allocate resources 
going forward to motivate and produce 
optimum sustainable results. Ongoing 
involvement of each type of participant will 
enable improved prediction, monitoring, and 
evaluation of actual short-term outputs, interim 
outcomes, and longer-term impacts both ex-
ante and as they transpire. The interim 
indicators of results that emerge from such 
actionable monitoring and evaluation systems 
will concurrently be reused in planning 
functions for concurrent informed assessment 
of performance and/or determination of 
necessary corrective action.  
Such concurrent evaluation in support of 
continuous innovation is necessary to make 
optimum future plans or portfolio allocation 
decisions that promote real progress. As a 
management systems consultant for the last two 
decades with experience in many sectors of 
society, I can testify that one of the biggest 
problems with the systems we rely on today is 
that they do not facilitate the establishment of 
these complex collective learning loops that 
often seem to come so naturally in their more 
simple form in individual humans. Fixing the 
ability of organizations to really learn at the 
organizational level is the biggest opportunity 
available to the field of evaluation. In all sectors 
or disciplines of society—from government to 
education to health to social services to 
agriculture to industry—evaluation needs to 
help each important link or constituent in their 
respective and integrated value chains to 
participate in the evaluation process as they do 
their best to prioritize their contributions that 
lead to coordinated action. Only then will 
development aid result in collective progress 
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across society. And only by recognizing and 
adequately nurturing this multidisciplinary role 
of evaluation will the transdiscipline of 





This article is pertinent because it helps 
international aid evaluators realize why they 
now have a historic opportunity to successfully 
assume a stronger role in achieving 
transformational progress. It discusses a case 
example that should stimulate the reader’s 
thoughts and understanding of the current state 
of evaluation in the international development 
assistance community. It explains justification 
for why evaluators must push to position 
evaluation earlier in the lifecycles of 
development efforts, using new tools and 
methods—such as ex-ante impact assessment—
to enable evaluators to meet the increased 
demands of this more strategic role for 
evaluation; and outlines the new solutions that 
will be used to achieve pro-poor growth, an 
achievement that is not only vital in a 
humanitarian sense but also, as explained, 
essential to securing the future of a more 
humanitarian form of freedom and democracy.  
This article shows how professional 
evaluation can help parties involved in 
international development value chains to better 
recognize opportunities for success and avoid 
catastrophic failure, and to better understand 
the challenges preventing eradication of poverty 
and what it takes to overcome them. It also 
provides insight into the coordinating 
mechanisms that will be needed to promote the 
harmonized cooperation that will eventually 
become the solution. Evaluation needs to show 
how clusters of contributions of individual 
participants can be appropriately combined to 
be able to satisfy the significant demands of 
development and that it is an undertaking 
worthy of our collective cooperation. Only then 
will all the necessary participants be able to be 
motivated and coordinated to participate in a 
solution that is sufficiently powerful to 
overcome the explained challenges.  
Success in international development will 
depend on maintaining ideals and hopes 
throughout adversity while informing realistic 
perspectives on what it will take to achieve 
progress. This will generate the collective 
understanding and motivate the collective 
action that is necessary to succeed in such 
adverse conditions. Hope can be defined as the 
difference between conservative expectation 
and more positive intentions. Hope can also be 
seen as what is necessary to provide the 
inspiration needed to motivate the extraordinary 
effort needed to achieve extraordinary results. 
By taking on a strategic role earlier in the 
lifecycle of international development efforts, 
evaluators can motivate participation and 
effective action, reinforcing positive intentions 
and unleashing the unbounded potential 
necessary to achieve global prosperity and 
poverty eradication. It is up to us evaluators to 
inform the vision for the future of those 
involved in development and maintain hope for 
progress.  
The main focus of this article was to clearly 
delineate the complex challenges and 
opportunities present in international 
development aid and how potential new 
monitoring and evaluation solutions will need to 
effectively overcome these challenges. Specific 
attention was paid to how monitoring and 
evaluation can be enhanced in strategic ways to 
attain the mutual accountability and 
harmonization that the Paris Declarations now 
demands from the international development 
community. The good news is that much has 
been done to augment and overcome limitations 
of past tools and methods. This means that 
appropriate new solutions can be anticipated 
that will better meet heightened demands for 
both mutual accountability and coordination 
while also enabling customized monitoring and 
evaluation solutions that practically fit the 
unique capabilities and requirements of each 
Ronald S. Visscher 




unique context. We explored how these new 
advancements might make it feasible and 
practical for evaluation professionals to succeed 
in their more strategic role, enabling the 
development community to satisfy the Paris 
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